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ARTICLE
Should morality be abolished? An empirical challenge to 
the argument from intolerance
Jennifer Cole Wrighta and Thomas Pölzler b
aDepartment of Psychology, College of Charleston, Charleston, United States; bUniversity of Gräz
ABSTRACT
Moral abolitionists claim that morality ought to be abolished. 
According to one of their most prominent arguments, this is 
because making moral judgments renders people signifi-
cantly less tolerant toward anyone who holds divergent 
views. In this paper we investigate the hypothesis that mor-
ality’s tolerance-decreasing effect only occurs if people are 
realists about moral issues, i.e., they interpret these issues as 
objectively grounded. We found support for this hypothesis 
(Studies 1 and 2). Yet, it also turned out that the intolerance 
associated with realism is mediated by moral conviction and 
perceived consensus. People tend to feel more strongly 
about those moral issues they ground objectively and, in 
doing so, are more prone to display the vice of moral smug-
ness toward those who disagree with them. The remedy for 
this that has been recommended is humility which we found 
(Study 3) is indeed related to reduced intolerance, in part by 
predicting a reduction in realism, but also in part through a 
direct connection to intolerance. These results put pressure 
on abolitionists’ “argument from intolerance.”
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Free thinkers and skeptics throughout history have entertained the suspi-
cion that morality is a mistake, a scam, a fiction that we make up; but few 
others have welcomed this idea with open minds. (Garner, 2011)
Does judging actions in terms of rightness/wrongness, goodness/badness, 
etc. make us better off – is it in our interest? Or should we rather do away 
with such judgments? At first blush such questions seem trivial; maybe even 
comical or absurd. Of course, the practice of making moral judgments is 
overall beneficial, we are inclined to respond. It prevents us from giving in to 
egoistic impulses; it helps us to resist the allure of short-term benefits; it 
incites us to cooperate and live together peacefully.
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Nevertheless, over the years some thinkers have argued that morality is 
actually harmful and should be abolished (e.g., Burgess, 2007; Garner, 1994, 
2007, 2019; Hinckfuss, 1987; Marks, 2013). On this “abolitionist” view, 
people should no longer believe actions to be morally right/wrong; they 
should only feel favorably or opposed to them, like or dislike them, or be 
willing to praise or punish those who engage in them (without making any 
corresponding moral judgment).1
In support of their view, abolitionists have provided several distinct 
arguments. For example, they have maintained that morality blinds people 
to the authoritarian nature of their society (Hinckfuss, 1987); that it is used 
to justify and preserve large-scale inequalities in power and economic status 
as a reflection of purported moral desert (Garner, 2007; Hinckfuss, 1987); 
and that it creates feelings of moral inferiority in people who believe they are 
bad, even vile, for committing moral wrongs (Hinckfuss, 1987; Marks, 
2013). In this paper we will be concerned with what is perhaps abolitionists’ 
most widespread and influential argument – the so-called “argument from 
intolerance”.
According to the argument from intolerance, people ought to stop think-
ing in moral terms because doing so makes them significantly more intol-
erant toward those holding divergent views. Morality makes people more 
narrow-minded, stubborn, and emotionally involved; it makes us less likely 
to acknowledge or even listen to plausible arguments in favor of an opposing 
view; it causes people to think of this opponent as someone who is ignorant, 
vicious or evil; and so on. All of this renders disagreements more intractable 
and volatile, preventing us from reaching compromises, even when this 
uncompromising stance negatively affects ours or others’ well-being 
(Garner, 2007, 1994 ; Greene, 2002; Hinckfuss, 1987; Marks, 2013).
Garner (2007), one of the most prominent contemporary abolitionists, 
puts this argument as follows:
Morality inflames disputes because moralizing an issue tends to excite and confuse the 
parties involved. If we hope to resolve conflicts by arriving at a compromise, our task 
will be easier if moral disagreements are seen as partial conflicts of interest “without 
the embroidery of rights and moral justification.” [. . .] The controversy over abortion 
would not be nearly as intractable as it has become if the fiction of moral rights had 
not been appropriated by both sides. If the issue is not moralized, Roe v. Wade looks 
like a sensible compromise between two extreme positions, but when the right to life 
is set against the right to choose, neither side can yield without violating morality. (p. 
502)
One way of criticizing the argument from intolerance is to deny that 
intolerance is (always) bad (Brink, 1989). In this paper, in contrast, we 
will focus on the argument’s underlying empirical hypothesis – namely, 
that morality decreases tolerance. The truth of this hypothesis is an empiri-
cal question; one that can only be answered by gathering data about 
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morality’s actual effects on people’s tolerance. Thus far abolitionists have 
supported their empirical hypothesis by appealing to anecdotal and intro-
spective evidence, as well as philosophical speculation (see, e.g., Garner’s 
above quotation; Hinckfuss, 1987; Marks, 2013).
Yet, psychologists have been investigating the relation between morality 
and tolerance for quite a while. Studies have found that people typically have 
stronger negative reactions toward divergent beliefs, values, and practices 
that involve moral issues than those that involve non-moral (e.g., personal 
or social) issues (Skitka et al., 2005; Skitka & Mullen, 2002; Wainryb et al., 
2004, 2001, 1998; Wright et al., 2008; Wright, 2012). They are also generally 
less supportive of moral diversity than other forms of diversity (Haidt et al., 
2003). In addition, people often make important distinctions between moral 
and other types of issues – e.g., they tend to treat moral wrongs as more 
serious, less permissible, and more severely punishable than social/conven-
tional wrongs (Turiel, 1983, 1998; see also Davidson et al., 1983; Goodwin & 
Darley, 2008; Nichols, 2004; Nichols & Folds-Bennett, 2003; Nucci, 1981; 
Smetana, 1981, 1983; Smetana & Braeges, 1990).
At first glance, these findings seem to support the argument from 
intolerance: people tend to have stronger negative reactions to moral 
transgressions, and they view them as more serious, more punishable, 
and so on.
Yet, there are two important limitations present in this body of 
research. The first is that the researchers assume an issue’s moral status 
without asking participants about this classification – even though 
further research (Wright, 2018; Wright et al., 2008, 2013, 2014) has 
clearly demonstrated that people of all ages disagree about what should 
be considered “moral” and what should not be. More importantly, this 
research averages across people’s responses to moral transgressions with-
out looking more closely to see: 1) what is actually driving morality’s 
tolerance-decreasing effect in these studies (i.e., is it viewing the trans-
gression as moral or is it something else), and 2) whether these effects are 
consistently present across a wide range of moral transgressions.
In other words, these studies leave it unclear whether the increased 
intolerance being witnessed is a function of simply viewing something as 
moral – i.e., as belonging in the moral domain, as opposed to some other 
(e.g., social or personal) domain – or if it is instead the result of factors that 
may precede, accompany, or result from such classifications, but that can be 
avoided, both as a matter of empirical and conceptual fact.
Another way of asking this question is whether “moralizing an issue” 
(Garner, 2007, p. 502), which abolitionists argue results in deeply proble-
matic (and intractable) intolerance, is simply a function of viewing an issue 
as moral, or whether there is something more going on. If it’s the former, 
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then the abolitionists have a point – maybe viewing things as belonging in 
the moral domain should be discouraged – but if it’s the latter, then maybe 
it’s not morality per se that is the problem, but something else.
But, what might that “something else” be? One plausible hypothesis appeals 
to what philosophers refer to as “moral realism”, i.e., the view that morality is 
grounded in objective facts, independent from the moral beliefs and attitudes 
of individuals and cultures (e.g., Brink, 1989; Huemer, 2005; Shafer-Landau, 
2003). According to this hypothesis, viewing an issue as moral only makes 
people less tolerant if they also view it as objectively grounded. After all, 
realism implies that there is a right answer (and only one right answer) as to 
whether something is morally good/bad, right/wrong. Anyone who disagrees 
with us must therefore be incorrect – eliminating (or lessening) the need for 
tolerance. If, on the other hand, people think that what is right/wrong, good/ 
bad, is determined by their own or their culture’s beliefs/attitudes or is not a 
matter of fact at all (that is, if people are anti-realists) then morality would 
largely cease to “excite and confuse” and generate intolerance.
Importantly, the hypothesis that objectivism mediates the relation 
between morality and intolerance has received some empirical support 
(e.g., Goodwin & Darley, 2012; Wright, 2018; Wright et al., 2013, 2014). 
Unfortunately, these early studies are vulnerable to methodological objec-
tions, including not fully or accurately capturing people’s meta-ethical 
intuitions (Beebe, 2015; Moss, 2017; Pölzler, 2018a, 2018b; Pölzler & 
Wright, 2019; Pölzler et al.,). Thus, our aim here is to test the hypothesis 
using measures we recently developed (Pölzler & Wright 2020). This will 
provide a reliable empirical assessment of the abolitionist argument from 
intolerance: of whether viewing something as moral by itself is sufficient to 
elicit higher levels of intolerance, or whether the “moralization” abolitionists 
worry about involves something else, namely moral realism.
To this end, we present three empirical studies. Studies 1 and 2 measured 
the relationship between people’s morality classifications and meta-ethical 
groundings and their intolerance. The results of these studies suggest that it is 
realism – not morality per se – that predicts intolerance for divergent moral 
views. They further suggest that several aspects of moral realism – namely a 
higher level of moral conviction about the issue and a greater perception of 
consensus within one’s community – are driving the relationship with this 
increased intolerance. In other words, moral realism is typically accompanied 
by (and/or accompanies) stronger moral conviction and greater perceived 
consensus, which both predict greater intolerance for divergent views.
This suggests that the cultivation of something that offsets this greater 
conviction and perceived consensus – one candidate being humility – may 
mitigate the connection between realism and intolerance. Study 3 explores 
this possibility, revealing that humility is indeed related to reduced intoler-
ance, via a connection to realism and, thus, to conviction.
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We close with a discussion of the implications of these findings for 
abolitionism, arguing that they put pressure on the argument from intoler-




Our first survey was taken by 173 participants from Amazon 
Mechanical Turk, an international online survey platform. 14 partici-
pants failed to complete the survey or failed over 10% of standard 
attention checks, leaving 159 participants: 56% male, 43% female, 1% 
other; 79% Caucasian, 8% African-American, 4% Asian-American, 7% 
Hispanic, 2% other. The average age was 38.3 years (SD = 12.8). We 
felt that a sample at or above 100 participants provided sufficient 
power for our analyses, given previous research conducted in our 
lab. The methods and results of Study 1 below report all measures 
and conditions used, as well as all data exclusions.
Design
Participants were presented fifteen issue-statements in random order, 
twelve of which described socially-relevant behaviors/activities and three 
of which described basic facts:
(1) selling children on the internet
(2) stealing money and/or supplies from the large company where you 
work
(3) consciously discriminating against another person on the basis of 
gender or race
(4) having sex with people other than your spouse or romantic partner 
(without him/her knowing)
(5) refusing to provide help to people who obviously need it
(6) helping terminally ill patients end their lives
(7) eating factory-farmed meat
(8) burning the American flag
(9) wearing your pajamas to an important business meeting
(10) smoking cigarettes in enclosed public space
(11) watching pornographic videos
(12) getting tattoos and/or body piercings
(13) the earth is flat
(14) Boston (Massachusetts) is farther north than Miami (Florida)
(15) the chemical formula of water molecules is H2O
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Participants were asked to classify each of these as belonging to one of the 
following four categories: (1) Personal choice/preference, (2) Social conven-
tion/norms, (3) Moral issue, (4) Scientific fact. Then they were presented 
with metaethics and tolerance tasks (the order of which was 
counterbalanced).
Metaethics tasks. To determine whether participants consider morality to 
be objective we used a three-step disagreement measure that we developed 
in previous research (Pölzler & Wright 2020). First participants were pre-
sented with an intra-cultural disagreement scenario for each of the issues 
listed above:
SCENARIO 1: Consider the following situation. Two people from the same 
culture discuss whether [ISSUE] is okay. One person says that [ISSUE] is okay. 
The other person says that it is not the case that [ISSUE] is okay. Which 
interpretation of this disagreement seems most appropriate to you?2
They were given the following responses to choose from:
(A1) One of these two people is right and the other one is wrong (Please note that this 
could be the case for several reasons: for example, because the truth of the people’s 
sentences is objective, or because it is determined by the dominant moral beliefs in 
their culture, or because it is determined by the commandments of God).
(A2) Both people are right (because the truth of their sentences is determined by the 
moral beliefs of individuals).
(A3) Both people are wrong (because although their sentences intend to state moral 
truths, there are no such truths).
(A4) Neither person is right or wrong (because their sentences do not intend to state
moral truths and are therefore neither true nor false).
If participants selected A1, then they were presented with an analogous 
cross-cultural disagreement scenario.
SCENARIO 2: In the previous task you indicated that when two people from 
the same culture utter conflicting sentences about whether [ISSUE] is okay, one 
of them is right and the other one is wrong. Suppose these disagreeing people 
are from different cultures. The person who says that [ISSUE] is okay is from a 
culture in which most people believe that this action is okay. The person who 
says that it is not the case that [ISSUE] is okay is from a culture in which most 
people believe that it is not the case that this action is okay. Which interpreta-
tion of this disagreement seems most appropriate to you?
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They were given the following responses to choose from:
(B1) One of these two people is right and the other one is wrong (Please note that this 
could be the case for either of the following reasons: for example, because the truth of 
the people’s sentences is objective, or because it is determined by the commandments 
of God).
(B2) Both people are right (because the truth of their sentences is determined by the 
dominant moral beliefs in cultures).
(B3) Both people are wrong (because although their sentences intend to state moral 
truths, there are no such truths).
(B4) Neither person is right or wrong (because their sentences do not intend to state 
moral truths and are therefore neither true nor false).
If participants selected B1, then they were presented with another disagree-
ment scenario:
SCENARIO 3: In the previous tasks you indicated that when two people utter 
conflicting sentences about whether [ISSUE] is okay, one of them is right and the 
other one is wrong. Suppose these disagreeing people live in worlds in which God 
wills different things. The person who says that [ISSUE] is okay lives in a world in 
which God does not forbid this action. The person who says that it is not the case that 
[ISSUE] is okay lives in a world in which God forbids this action. Which interpreta-
tion of this disagreement seems most appropriate to you?
They were given the following responses to choose from:
(C1) One of these two people is right and the other one is wrong (Please note that this 
is because the truth of the people’s sentences is objective).
(C2) Both people are right (because the truth of the people’s sentences is determined 
by the commandments of God).
(C3) Both people are wrong (because although their sentences intend to state moral 
truths, there are no such truths).
(C4) Neither person is right or wrong (because their sentences do not intend to state 
moral truths, and are therefore neither true nor false).
We then coded for meta-ethical positions based on the following choice 
patterns (See Table 1):
● Realism: A1, B1, and C1
● Divine Command Theory: A1, B2, and C2
● Cultural Relativism: A1 and B2
● Individual Subjectivism: A2
● Non-Cognitivism: A4
● Error Theory: A3
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Other measures. Participants were also asked the following strength of 
agreement, consensus, and tolerance questions:
● STRENGTH OF AGREEMENT: Do you agree or disagree (6 points: 
Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree) with the following statement: 
“[ISSUE] is okay”? Following the strategy used to measure moral 
conviction used in Wright et al. (2008), this was used to generate the 
CONVICTION variable by folding along the mid-point, so that 3/4’s 
represented the lowest level of conviction and 1’s/6’s represented the 
strongest level of conviction.
● CONSENSUS: How many people from your own community do you 
think would agree with you? (6 points: Almost nobody would agree to 
Almost everyone would agree)
● PROHIBIT/CONDONE: With respect to [ISSUE], how acceptable 
would it be (6 points: Very Acceptable to Very Unacceptable) for 
society: to pass a law prohibiting it? to condone/support it?
○ With respect to [ISSUE], would you be willing to (6 points: Not very 
willing to Very willing; positive tolerance, negative intolerance):
○ be friends with someone who disagrees with you
○ have a friendly discussion about it with someone who disagrees with 
you
○ participate in a public debate about the pros and cons of the issue
Table 1. Flowchart of meta-ethical groundings.




Realism one right, one wrong one right, one wrong one right, one wrong
Divine Command 
Theory
one right, one wrong one right, one wrong both right
Cultural Relativism one right, one wrong both right
Individual Subjectivism both right
Non-Cognitivism both wrong
Error Theory neither right or wrong
Study 2 
Disagreement
Realism one correct, one incorrect one correct, one incorrect
Cultural Relativism one correct, one incorrect both correct
Individual Subjectivism both correct both correct
Non-Cognitivism neither correct or incorrect neither correct or incorrect
Nonstandard any other combination of responses
Agreement/Disagreement
Realism both correct one correct, one incorrect
Cultural Relativism one correct, one incorrect one correct, one incorrect
Individual Subjectivism both correct both correct
Non-Cognitivism neither correct or incorrect neither correct or incorrect
Nonstandard any other combination of responses
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○ have a private debate about the pros and cons with a group of friends
○ publicly support a friend/family member who engages in the 
behavior
○ privately support a friend/family member who engages in the 
behavior
○ seriously consider the opposite view (from what you currently 
believe)
○ advocate in favor of it in a public setting
○ publicly shame someone for engaging in the behavior
○ personally shun someone for engaging in the behavior
○ advocate against it in a public setting
● With respect to [ISSUE], if someone did this, what do you think would 
be true of them (6 points: Strongly disagree to Strongly agree; positive 
tolerance, negative intolerance)?
○ They would be different, but different is okay.
○ They would probably not be that different from me.
○ They would be living the way they thought was best.
○ They would be someone who is obviously proud of who they are.
○ They would be someone who doesn’t care much about themselves.
○ They would be doing something they knew deep down was wrong.
○ They would not have the same values as I do.
○ They would be a bad person.
○ They would be someone who doesn’t care much about other people.3
The “positive tolerance” and “negative intolerance” question responses were 
averaged together into summary variables for the purposes of analysis.
Results
Domain classification/Grounding
Table 2 shows the breakdown of the domain classifications. Six issue- 
statements were dominantly classified by participants (i.e., received the 
highest classification percentage) as moral, three as social/conventional, 
three as personal, and three statements as factual.4
Of the six issue-statements classified as moral, five were given dom-
inantly anti-realist groundings (which includes all meta-ethical positions 
except realism) and one was given a dominantly realist grounding. Of 
those classified as social and personal, all were given dominantly anti- 
realist groundings, and those classified as factual were given dominantly 
realist groundings.
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The moral domain as a domain of intolerance
Since participants classified the issue-statements into domains themselves 
(and thus potentially differently from one another), we calculated the means 
of the other measures by domain separately for each participant (a techni-
que employed in Wright et al., 2008, 201, 2014). This gave every participant 
a mean for every variable within each of the four domains. Analyses were 
conducted on these means.
We ran a repeated measures ANOVA with classification domain (perso-
nal/social/moral/factual) and tolerance type (prohibit/condone/positive/ 
negative tolerance) as within-participants variables. This revealed a main 
effect for classification domain, F(3,417) = 8.7, p< .001, η2 = .06, and 
tolerance type, F(3,417) = 35.6, p< .001, η2 = .20, and a significant two- 
way interaction, F(9,1251) = 116.1, p< .001, η2 = .46.
Paired-sample t-tests were then run, revealing that there was increased 
intolerance across the board for those behaviors people had categorized as 
moral. Specifically, participants thought prohibition was much more accep-
table and condoning was much less acceptable, ts(142) = 6.7 and 6.3, ps < 
.001, for those behaviors they considered to be moral than those they 
considered to be social. And the same thing was true when comparing 
behaviors considered moral to those considered to be personal, ts 
(151) = 17.4 and 11.6, ps < .001, and to those considered to be factual, ts 
(154) = 17.9 and 11.1, ps < .001 (Figure 1).
Participants were also less willing to express positive tolerance, and more 
willing to express negative intolerance, ts(142) = 8.0 and 7.7, ps < .001, for 
behaviors they considered to be moral than for behaviors they considered to 
Table 2. Domain clasifications and groundings.
Personal Social Moral Factual
Anti- 
Realist Realist
1 Selling children on the internet 4% 6% 88% 2% 38% 62%
2 Stealing money and/or supplies from the large 
company where you work
5% 13% 79% 3% 61% 39%
3 Consciously discriminating against another person on 
the basis of gender or race
11% 21% 64% 4% 55% 45%
4 Having sex with people other than your spouse or 
romantic partner (without him/her knowing)
15% 13% 68% 4% 72% 28%
5 Refusing to provide help to people who obviously 
need it
29% 11% 59% 1% 78% 22%
6 Helping terminally ill patients end their lives 28% 9% 62% 1% 82% 18%
7 Eating factory-farmed meat 60% 8% 29% 3% 91% 9%
8 Burning the American flag 17% 59% 21% 3% 87% 13%
9 Wearing your pajamas to an important business 
meeting
26% 67% 4% 2% 91% 9%
10 Smoking cigarettes in enclosed public space 18% 48% 23% 11% 69% 31%
11 Watching pornographic videos 62% 11% 25% 3% 91% 9%
12 Getting tattoos and/or body piercings 78% 15% 5% 2% 92% 8%
13 The earth is flat 12% 3% 3% 82% 45% 55%
14 Boston (Massachusetts) is farther north than Miami 
(Florida)
3% 4% 3% 89% 36% 64%
15 The chemical formula of water molecules is H2O 3% 4% 2% 91% 40% 60%
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be social. And, once again, the same thing was true when comparing 
behaviors considered to be moral to those considered to be personal, ts 
(151) = 16.3 and 16.8, ps < .001, and to those considered to be factual, ts 
(154) = 8.6 and 7.7, ps < .001 (Figure 1).
In sum, taken by themselves, these findings show a strong relationship 
between moral categorization and intolerance, providing support for the 
view that there is something specific about morality (that is, viewing some-
thing as moral) that breeds intolerance for disagreement and divergence.
Moral realism vs. Anti-realism
But, was this higher level of intolerance a function of something being 
classified as moral, as abolitionists suggest – or something else? To examine 
this, we ran another repeated measures ANOVA with classification domain 
and tolerance type (same as above) as within-participants variables – only 
this time the domain categories we used were: personal, social, moral realist, 
and moral anti-realist (and once again, since participants had classified each 
issue-statement as being objectively or non-objectively grounded for them-
selves, we calculated the means for grounding by domain separately for each 
participant and analyses were conducted on these means).
This once again revealed a main effect for domain, F(3,264) = 8.5, p< .001, 
η2 = .09, and for tolerance type, F(3,264) = 40.0, p< .001, η2 = .32, and a 
significant two-way interaction, F(9,792) = 102.4, p< .001, η2 = .54.
Paired-sample t-tests were then run, revealing that the increased intoler-
ance toward moral divergence previously found is largely explained by 
people taking a realist stance. Specifically, participants thought prohibition 








Prohibit Unacceptable Condone Unacceptable Willing to Express Posive
Tolerance
Willing to Express Negave
Intolerance
Chart Title
Personal Social Moral Factual
Figure 1. Study 1: Tolerance by domain.
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(100) = 9.5 and 8.6, ps < .001, for those behaviors they considered to be 
moral and objectively grounded than for those they considered to be moral 
and non-objectively grounded. The same relation was found when compar-
ing behaviors considered moral and objectively grounded to those consid-
ered to be personal, ts(112) = 22.0 and 14.2, ps < .001, and to those 
considered to be social, ts(103) = 11.2 and 10.0, ps < .001. Yet, there was 
not a significant difference in how acceptable participants found the prohi-
bition or condoning of behaviors they considered to be moral and non- 
objectively grounded and those they considered to be social, ts(129) = 2.0 
and 1.6, ps > .05 (Figure 2).
Participants were also less willing to express positive tolerance, and more 
willing to express negative intolerance, ts(100) = 10.1 and 9.0, ps < .001, 
when they considered the behaviors to be moral and objectively grounded 
than when they considered them to be moral and non-objectively grounded. 
The same relation was found when comparing behaviors participants con-
sidered to be moral and objectively grounded to those they considered to be 
personal, ts(112) = 18.9 and 17.1, ps < .001, and to those they considered to 
be social, ts(103) = 13.1 and 11.3, ps < .001. Yet, once again, there was not a 
significant difference in how willing participants were to express positive 
and negative intolerance between behaviors they considered to be moral and 
non-objectively grounded and those they considered to be social, ts 
(129) = 2.0 and 1.6, ps > .05 (Figure 2).
Participants still displayed greater intolerance for behaviors they had 
considered moral and non-objectively grounded than for those they con-








Prohibit Unacceptable Condone Unacceptable Willing to Express Posive
Tolerance
Willing to Express Negave
Intolerance
Chart Title
Personal Social Moral An-Realist Moral Realist
Figure 2. Study 1: Tolerance by domain and grounding.
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this is entirely consistent with our hypothesis. After all, no abolitionist that 
we are aware of argues that we should treat all behaviors as personal choices, 
or that all forms of intolerance are unacceptable. Instead their argument is 
that all the social regulation of human behavior that we need in order to 
prevent/punish bad behavior and promote/reward good behavior happens 
at the level of social norms, rules, regulations, laws, etc. Thus, their problem 
with morality – with viewing these “bad and good behaviors” as moral – is 
that it adds an extra level of intolerance, which is not only unnecessary, but 
also causes more problems than it is worth.
This makes the comparison between the moral and the social domains the 
critical one. If the abolitionists are right, then viewing something as moral 
should generate a higher level of intolerance than viewing it as social. What 
we have now shown, however, is that there is only a relationship between 
moral categorization and intolerance when the issue is viewed both as moral 
and as objectively grounded.
The role of moral conviction and perceived consensus
This suggests that moral realism could really be what is driving people’s 
intolerance; not morality, per se. But what sorts of things are related to 
whether people ground moral issues objectively, and can they help to 
explain realism’s connection to intolerance? Previous research suggests 
two possibilities – stronger moral conviction and greater levels of perceived 
consensus within one’s community. That is, viewing a moral issue as 
objectively grounded tends to be accompanied by (or accompany) feeling 
more convinced about it – about its moral rightness or wrongness – and 
viewing all others “like you” as agreeing with you (making anyone who 
disagrees a deviant) (Beebe et al. 2015; Beebe and Sackris 2016; Goodwin 
and Darley 2008, 2012; Wright, 2018; Wright et al., 2013, 2014).
So, could either of these variables be doing the “heavy lifting” where 
intolerance is concerned? To answer this question the first thing we looked 
at is the relationship between moral realism vs anti-realism, moral convic-
tion, and perceived consensus. Analyses showed that both strength of 
conviction and consensus were positively correlated with the percentage 
of moral issues participants gave realist groundings, rs(155) = .47, p< .001 
and .29, p= .004 respectively. Thus, as we suspected, the tendency to view 
moral issues as objectively grounded is accompanied by (or accompanies) 
both stronger conviction and greater perceived consensus.
But do one or both of conviction and consensus mediate the relationship 
between realism and intolerance – or does realism predict intolerance 
independently? To examine this, we first needed to create a composite 
“intolerance” variable, which we did by averaging together all the positive 
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and negative tolerance questions for each issue-statement identified by 
participants as moral into one composite variable (a Cronbach’s alpha of 
.86 reinforced the acceptability of doing this).
We then used AMOS 26.0 to analyze a model in which we assumed that 
perceived consensus would predict moral realism, which would in turn 
predict strength of conviction – all three of which would also independently 
predict intolerance (Figure 3). This revealed significant relationships 
between all variables, except one – people’s realism no longer directly 
predicted intolerance, once entered into this model. In other words, people’s 
perception of consensus in their peer group predicted their being realist 
about morality (standardized β = .23, p= .004), which predicted the strength 
of their moral conviction (standardized β = .47, p< .001). In addition, both 
conviction and consensus continued to independently predict intolerance, 
while realism ceased to do so (conviction: standardized β = .58, p< .001; 
consensus: standardized β = .16, p= . 009; realism: standardized β = .12, 
p= . 07).
To examine the “goodness of fit” of this model, we examined several 
normally reported indices: the Chi-square (X2) test, the Normed Fit Index 
(NFI), Tucker-Lewis Index (TFI), and the Comparative Fit Index (CFI), 
which all compare the similarity of the covariance matrix predicted by the 
model and the observed indicators’ covariance matrix. Higher values (ide-
ally above .90) for these indices are desirable, as are non-significant X2 
values (Bentler, 1993). Our analysis of the model yielded overall good fit 
estimates for all three: Χ2,1 = 2.501, p= .114, NFI = .983, TFI = .893, and 
CFI = .989. In addition, the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation 
(RMSEA) is typically reported, which takes into account model complexity. 
Our RMSEA score was .09 (lower = .00, upper = .258). While typically 
RMSEA values below .05 indicate a good fit, the corresponding PCLOSE 
Figure 3. Study 1: Model of consensus, conviction, and grounding.
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analysis of our RMSEA confidence interval was non-significant (.183), 
indicating that the model was a suitably “close” fit (Browne & Cudeck, 
1993; MacCallum et al., 1996). Importantly, we ran a variety of other 
models, including one in which we removed the regression pathway 
between realism and intolerance, and this was overall the best fitting 
model, one that conceptually makes sense.
Discussion
The results from Study 1 support the view that moral judgments are in 
fact – as the abolitionists suggest – accompanied by more intolerance 
than other sorts of socially-relevant judgments. Yet, it appears that this 
increased intolerance is related to only certain kinds of moral judgments, 
namely those given objective (realist) groundings. When people ground 
moral issues non-objectively (e.g., on their own and their culture’s moral 
beliefs, values, etc.) they do not show the same elevated intolerance, 
despite viewing the issues as moral. This suggests that the extra intoler-
ance associated with morality may be driven by viewing the rightness/ 
wrongness of moral issues as grounded by objective facts.
Importantly, though, even this isn’t the whole story, as our findings 
suggest that other factors are playing a critical predictive role here. 
Specifically, people expressed stronger conviction and a greater level of 
perceived consensus for those moral issues they gave realist groundings 
than for those they gave anti-realist groundings. And our model supported 
the supposition that simply viewing issues as objectively grounded by itself is 
not significantly related to greater intolerance.
Specifically, we found that people’s perception of shared consensus 
(most people in my community would agree with me) predicted their 
tendency to be realist about moral issues, which predicted the strength of 
their convictions about those issues, which (in turn) predicted their intol-
erance for divergence. While their perception of consensus also remained 
predictive of their intolerance (as anyone who disagrees would be seen as 
an “outsider” not to be tolerated), the degree of their realism did not, 
suggesting that the connection between realism and intolerance is 
mediated by people's conviction.
Of course, there are several limitations to Study 1, most of which pertain 
to our measure of moral objectivity. Elsewhere we argued that the layered 
disagreement measure that we used in Study 1 is more valid than previous 
measures for ascertaining people’s meta-ethical intuitions (Pölzler & Wright 
2020). Nonetheless, it is still vulnerable to a few important objections. In 
Study 2 we developed alternative measures to accommodate these worries.
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First, our original measure provided several ways of being anti-realist, but 
only one specific way of being realist.5 This unequal distribution was 
necessitated by our attempting to discriminate between several dominant 
anti-realist views.6 In Study 2 we dropped two of these views: divine 
command theory and error theory. In a previous study (Pölzler & Wright 
2020) and in Study 1 only few participants chose these views, so eliminating 
them seemed like a straightforward way to make the options more balanced.
A second potential worry concerns the specific formulation of our answer 
options. Following the interpretation of the presented situation (e.g., “One 
person is right and the other one is wrong”) these options also involved a 
brief explanation of this interpretation (e.g., “Please note that this could be 
the case for several reasons: for example, because the truth of the people’s 
sentences is objective, or because it is determined by the dominant moral 
beliefs in their culture, or because it is determined by the commandments of 
God”). While introduced to minimize confusion, these explanations could 
have nonetheless prompted explicit reasoning about moral objectivity or 
otherwise biased people’s intuitive responses. A more implicit measure may 
introduce less bias (see Pölzler et al.,; Zijlstra forthcoming), so we removed 
these additional explanations from our answer options.
Another worry is that previous research suggests that perceptions of 
societal disagreement influence people’s metaethical intuitions – specifi-
cally, the more society disagrees about a moral issue the more likely the 
issue is to receive an anti-realist grounding (e.g., Ayars & Nichols, 2020; 
Goodwin & Darley, 2012; Wright et al., 2013, 2014). Thus, by focusing on 
moral disagreements, and suggesting a high prevalence of such disagree-
ments, we may have led people to regard item statements as less realist than 
they would otherwise have regarded them.7 To rule this out, we presented 
half of Study 2 participants with a task asking them to interpret a case of 
agreement as well.
Also, in Study 1 participants only received the cross-cultural disagree-
ment task if they answered the intra-cultural tasks in a particular way. 
While metaethically sensible, from a psychological perspective this might 
have decreased the salience of cross-cultural moral disagreement. Had this 
been more salient to participants, they may have answered differently, 
increasing the frequency of cultural relativism in the cross-cultural tasks. 
In Study 2 we therefore presented participants with the intra-cultural and 
the cross-cultural disagreement tasks side by side (see also Sarkissian et al., 
2011), and our new agreement measure started with a cross-cultural 
scenario.
Finally, in our original measure we stated all answer options in terms of 
the disagreeing parties being “right” or “wrong”. These terms are ambig-
uous. Some participants may not have applied our intended interpretation – 
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the parties are correct or incorrect – but instead assumed that the terms 
express a moral evaluation. To avoid this misunderstanding, Study 2 used 




We had 259 participants take the survey through Amazon Mechanical Turk. 
Eight participants failed over 10% of standard attention checks, leaving 251 
participants (116 disagreement condition; 134 agreement condition), 49% male, 
51% female; 79% Caucasian, 6% African-American, 5% Asian-American, 6% 
Hispanic, 3% other. The average age was 37.1 years (SD = 10.7). We felt that a 
sample at or above 200 participants provided sufficient power for our analyses, 
given previous research conducted in our lab and the fact that now we had two 
main between-subject conditions. The methods and results of Study 2 below 
report all measures and conditions used, as well as all data exclusions.
Design
To save time, we reduced the number of randomly presented issues to 14 
(dropping one factual statement). Also, we randomly assigned people to one 
of the two different meta-ethical scenario options. For the disagreement mea-
sure, we used the same design as Study 1, except for removing the Divine 
Command Theory and Error Theory choice options and presenting the intra- 
cultural and cross-cultural situations side by side. For the new agreement/ 
disagreement measure, we tried to offset the biasing effects of being exposed 
to disagreement by starting with a situation in which two people agreed with 
each other before asking them to consider a situation in which they disagreed.
Option 1: Disagreement measure.
Consider the following situation. Two people who are members of the same culture or 
community discuss whether [ISSUE] is okay. One person says that [INSERT ISSUE] is 
okay. The other person says that [ISSUE] is not okay. Which interpretation of this 
situation seems most appropriate to you?
(A1) One of these two people is correct and the other one is incorrect
(A2) Both people are correct
(A3) Neither person is correct or incorrect
Consider the following situation. Two people who are members of different cultures 
or communities discuss whether [ISSUE] is okay. The person who says that [ISSUE] is 
okay is from a culture or community in which most people believe that this action is 
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okay. The person who says that [INSERT ISSUE] is not okay is from a culture or 
community in which most people believe that this action is not okay. Which inter-
pretation of this situation seems most appropriate to you?
(B1) One of these two people is correct and the other one is incorrect
(B2) Both people are correct
(B3) Neither person is correct or incorrect
For each item-statement we coded meta-ethical positions based on the 
following choice patterns:
● Realism: A1 and B1
● Cultural Relativism: A1 and B2
● Individual Subjectivism: A2 and B2
● Non-Cognitivism: A3 and B3
● Nonstandard: any other combination
Option 2: Agreement/Disagreement measure.
Consider the following situation. Two people who are members of different cultures 
or communities discuss whether [ISSUE] is okay. They both say that this action is 
okay.
The first person who says that [ISSUE] is okay is from a culture or community in 
which most people believe that this action is okay.
The second person who says that [ISSUE] is okay is from a culture or community in 
which most people believe that this action is not okay.
Which interpretation of this situation seems most appropriate to you?
(A1) The first person is correct and the second person is incorrect
(A2) Both people are correct or both people are incorrect
(A3) Neither person is correct or incorrect
Consider the following situation. Two people who are members of the same culture or 
community discuss whether [ISSUE] is okay. One person says that [ISSUE] is okay. 
The other person says that [INSERT ISSUE] is not okay. Which interpretation of this 
situation seems most appropriate to you?
(B1) One of these two people is correct and the other one is incorrect
(B2) Both people are correct
(B3) Neither person is correct or incorrect
For each item-statement we coded meta-ethical positions based on the 
following choice patterns:
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● Realism: A2 and B1
● Cultural Relativism: A1 and B1
● Individual Subjectivism: A2 and B2
● Non-Cognitivism: A3 and B3
● Nonstandard: any other combination
Tolerance tasks. Regardless of which meta-ethical option people received, 
the same tolerance questions were asked as in Study 1. Once again, the order 
of the metaethics and tolerance tasks was counterbalanced.
Results
Domain classification/Grounding
Table 3 shows the breakdown of the domain classifications for both options: six 
issues were dominantly classified as moral, three as social, three as personal, and 
two as factual. Of the six issues classified as moral, two were given dominantly 
anti-realist groundings and four dominantly realist groundings. Those classified 
as social and personal were given dominantly anti-realist groundings and those 
classified as factual were given dominantly realist groundings.
Moral domain as domain of intolerance
We once again created a composite “intolerance” variable by averaging together all 
the positive and negative tolerance questions for each issue-statement identified by 
participants as moral into one composite variable (Cronbach’s alpha of .88). We 
then ran a repeated measures ANOVA with classification domain (personal/ 
social/moral/factual) and tolerance type as within-participants variables (Figure 
4). This revealed a main effect for domain, F(3,696) = 5.9, p= .001, η2 = .025, and 
tolerance type, F(4,928) = 46.8, p< .001, η2 = .17, and a significant two-way 
interaction, F(12,2784) = 189.7, p< .001, η2 = .45. Again, participants were more 
intolerant of divergence for those issues that they had classified as moral. 
Specifically, they thought prohibition of behaviors was more acceptable, ts 
(235) = 2.8–16.3, ps< .001-.005, and condoning them was more unacceptable, ts 
(235) = 5.5–15.5, ps< 001, when they were considered moral. Participants were 
also less willing to express positive tolerance, ts(235) = 8.0–9.8, ps< 001, and more 
willing to express negative intolerance, ts(235) = 9.6–22.6, ps< 001 (Figure 4).
When we added condition (disagreement/agreement) as a between- 
participant variable to the analysis, this revealed a main effect for condition, F 
(1,231) = 11.3, p= .001, η2 = .05, though there were no significant interactions 
with the other variables. In general, participants who were in the Disagree 
condition expressed a higher level of intolerance than those in the Agree 
condition. When compared across the different domains and categories of 
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tolerance, there was very little discernible difference between the two (Figure 5). 
This suggests, among other things, that our emphasis on disagreement in Study 
1 did not overly bias participants’ responses in one direction or the other.
Moral realism vs. Anti-realism
As in Study 1, we ran another repeated measures ANOVA with domain – 
personal, social, moral realism, and moral anti-realism – and tolerance type 
as within-participants variables. This revealed a main effect for domain, F 
Table 3. Domain clasifications and groundings across conditions.
Option 1: Disagreement                                                          
Personal Social Moral Factual Anti-Realist Realist
Selling children on the internet 3% 7% 87% 3% 12% 81%
Stealing money and/or supplies from the large 
company where you work
5% 7% 85% 3% 21% 70%
Consciously discriminating against another 
person on the basis of gender or race
14% 24% 59% 3% 16% 73%
Having sex with people other than your spouse 
or romantic partner (without him/her 
knowing)
18% 10% 69% 3% 35% 42%
Refusing to provide help to people who 
obviously need it
22% 9% 67% 3% 51% 41%
Eating factory-farmed meat 64% 5% 27% 4% 70% 15%
Smoking cigarettes in enclosed public space 22% 45% 21% 12% 24% 55%
Helping terminally ill patients end their lives 16% 7% 74% 3% 54% 29%
Watching pornographic videos 66% 6% 26% 2% 59% 28%
Burning the American flag 18% 52% 29% 1% 41% 41%
Wearing your pajamas to an important business 
meeting
33% 63% 3% 1% 56% 27%
Getting tattoos and/or body piercings 83% 7% 7% 3% 65% 18%
Boston (Massachusetts) is farther north than 
Miami (Florida)
6% 4% 3% 87% 9% 84%
On earth, the chemical formula of water 
molecules is H2O
3% 3% 2% 91% 10% 84%
Option 2: Agreement                                                            
Personal Social Moral Factual Anti-Realist Realist
Selling children on the internet 4% 9% 86% 1% 13% 51%
Stealing money and/or supplies from the large 
company where you work
9% 9% 79% 3% 24% 42%
Consciously discriminating against another 
person on the basis of gender or race
11% 19% 69% 1% 22% 43%
Having sex with people other than your spouse 
or romantic partner (without him/her 
knowing)
20% 8% 69% 2% 35% 37%
Refusing to provide help to people who 
obviously need it
23% 14% 62% 1% 42% 36%
Eating factory-farmed meat 61% 13% 21% 4% 59% 14%
Smoking cigarettes in enclosed public space 25% 46% 18% 11% 38% 34%
Helping terminally ill patients end their lives 22% 13% 62% 2% 57% 22%
Watching pornographic videos 67% 11% 19% 3% 57% 20%
Burning the American flag 19% 50% 28% 3% 53% 22%
Wearing your pajamas to an important business 
meeting
31% 60% 5% 4% 49% 22%
Getting tattoos and/or body piercings 79% 13% 7% 1% 50% 22%
Boston (Massachusetts) is farther north than 
Miami (Florida)
7% 9% 2% 82% 40% 46%
On earth, the chemical formula of water 
molecules is H2O
4% 2% 4% 89% 48% 43%
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(3,267) = 3.2, p= .04, and tolerance type, F(4,356) = 13.1, p< .001, η2 = .13, 
and a significant interaction, F(12,1068) = 50.6, p< .001, η2 = .36. Again, 
there was an increased intolerance for those issues people had categorized as 
morally realist, but not anti-realist. People treated the moral issues they had 
given anti-realist groundings the same as issues they had classified as social. 
Thus, in line with Study 1, the extra intolerance that abolitionists attribute to 
moral judgments appears largely to be a function of the relationship 
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Figure 5. Study 2: Tolerance by domain (Disagreement and agreement options).
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Once again, we added condition (disagreement/ agreement) as a between- 
participant variable to the analysis. This revealed a main effect for condition, 
F(1,88) = 8.0, p= .006, η2 = .08, with no significant interactions with the 
other variables. Participants who were in the Disagree condition expressed a 
higher level of intolerance than those in the Agree condition. When com-
pared across the different domains and categories of tolerance, there was 
little discernible difference between the agreement and disagreement 
conditions.
Moral conviction and perceived consensus
We next investigated the relationship between moral realism, conviction, 
and consensus. Analyses showed that both strength of conviction and 
consensus were positively correlated with the percentage of moral issues 
to which they gave realist groundings, rs(248) = .29, p< .001 and .30, p< .001 
respectively. Thus, as in Study 1, the tendency to view moral issues as 
objectively grounded was accompanied by (or accompanied) both stronger 
conviction and greater perceived consensus; and both conviction and con-
sensus were strongly correlated with participants’ intolerance – rs 
(248) = .60, p< .001 and .39, p< .001 respectively, with this relationship 
once again being strongest for conviction.
We then used AMOS 26.0 to analyze the same model proposed in Study 1 
(Figure 7). This revealed significant relationships between all variables – this 
time, including one between realism and intolerance. In other words, 
people’s perception of consensus predicted their realism about morality 
(standardized β = .30, p< .001), which predicted the strength of their 
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Figure 6. Study 2: Tolerance by domain and grounding.
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consensus, and realism all independently predicted intolerance (conviction: 
standardized β = .49, p< .001; consensus: standardized β = .22, p< .001; 
realism: standardized β = .23, p< .001).
One issue with this model is that the “goodness of fit” was reasonable, but 
not as good as in Study 1: Χ2,1 = 6.285, p= .012, NFI = .97, TFI = .732, and 
CFI = .973. Our RMSEA score was .15 (lower = .054, upper = .263), with a 
significant PCLOSE analysis (.043), indicating that the model was not a 
suitably “close” fit.
Once again, we tested alternative models with these variables, none of which 
produced a better fit. Thus, we decided to re-run the model with the addition of 
the “condition” variable included, indicating which condition participants 
received (Agree/Disagree). Since condition was correlated with both realism 
(r= .30, p< .001) and perceived consensus (r= .30, p< .001), we entered it into the 
model accordingly. We also found that including a direct pathway between 
condition and intolerance improved the model fit, so we included that as well, 
with the final model displayed in Figure 8. This showed that the condition 
participants received was significantly predictive of consensus (standardized 
β = .15, p= .018), realism (standardized β = .26, p< .001), and intolerance 
(standardized β = .26, p< .001). While the betas shifted slightly, all the other 
relationships between the variables remained the same, and the “goodness of fit” 
showed a much stronger model: Χ2,1 = 6.762, p= .034, NFI = .97, TFI = .84, and 
Figure 7. Study 2: Model of consensus, conviction, and grounding.
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CFI = .98. Our RMSEA score was .098 (lower = .023, upper = .183), with a non- 
significant PCLOSE analysis (.119), indicating that the model is not a suitably 
“close” fit.
Discussion
Study 2 replicated the findings of Study 1, even after addressing several 
potential methodological concerns, with the noted exception of only a 
partial mediation model, since realism remained independently predictive 
of intolerance. Nonetheless, once again, we found that people’s perception 
of shared consensus predicted their tendency to be realists about moral 
issues, which predicted the strength of their convictions about those issues – 
and both independently predicted tolerance.
Across both studies, conviction was by far the strongest predictor of 
intolerance. This raises the following question: What is the nature of the 
relationship between realism and conviction, and why is it so strongly 
related to increased intolerance? One insight comes from a discussion of 
the vice of moral arrogance – or “smugness” (Lenman, 2014) – that often 
Figure 8. Study 2: Model of consensus, conviction, and grounding W/ condition.
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accompanies realism (even though it is not necessitated by it; Brink, 1989). 
Here, the thought is that realism engenders an unwarranted sense of cer-
tainty and superiority over one’s interlocuter(s). This means that not only 
do realists (by definition) hold that for every case of moral disagreement, 
only one side can be right; they also assume that if they happen to be 
involved in any of those disagreements themselves, then they can feel 
confident that they (not the other parties) are the ones that are right. If 
this is correct, then it suggests a reason why conviction is a much stronger 
predictor of intolerance than perceived consensus – and that is because 
while believing that everyone else agrees with you is clearly relevant to 
whether or not you have to tolerate an “outsider”, being morally arrogant 
about your own views would likely foster intolerance regardless of whether 
you happen to think everyone else agrees with you or not.
One recommended remedy for such “smugness” in the face of moral 
disagreement is a healthy dose of humility, which involves the acknowl-
edgment of one’s fallibility and proneness to error, embracing the incom-
pleteness and fragility of one’s understanding of the world, resulting in an 
openness to new information and divergent views (Brink, 1989; Tangney, 
2000).
In other words, protecting against the socially problematic intolerance 
that comes with realism may not necessarily require that we cease to be 
realists, only that we cultivate traits that combat the pernicious effects that 
accompany it, i.e., an inflexible mind-set, closemindedness, a sense of 
infallibility, feelings of superiority, etc. In short, we need to cultivate a 
healthy level of humility.
As Lenman writes:
I don’t often catch myself thinking, I think wanton cruelty is wrong but maybe I’m 
wrong about that. And I don’t think I am much at fault not thinking this. On the other 
hand, I shouldn’t make things too easy for myself by exploiting too readily the 
emotional buttons [i.e., that generate intolerance for divergence] I know examples 
like this must press. I know too, after all, that history is full of people who held, with 
equally unshakably confidence, moral beliefs that I no less confidently reject. (p. 10)
As strongly as we may feel about our moral views, they need to always be 
accompanied with a healthy dose of humility; understanding that, in the 
end, it may turn out that we are wrong, as so many other of our epistemic 
peers have been in the past. We are, after all, no more immune to fallibility 
and error than they were.
But is it indeed the case that humility mitigates the intolerance that 
accompanies strong conviction and moral realism? If so, then we should 
expect dispositional humility to predict reduced intolerance, even for those 
moral issues people ground objectively.
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Of course, even if this were the case, there are several distinct possible 
pathways through which humility and decreased intolerance are related. It 
could be, for example, that humility is directly related to intolerance – the 
higher someone’s humility, the less intolerant they are of moral disagree-
ment, even for issues they view as objective and for which they have strong 
conviction. But it could also be that humility is related to weaker conviction; 
thus, people high in humility feel less conviction toward moral issues they 
view as objective, which (since conviction mediates the relationship between 
realism and intolerance) explains their lower intolerance. Or, finally, it could 
be that humility is related to decreased realism: people high in humility are 
more anti-realist, and thus less intolerant.
To investigate the relationship between humility, realism, conviction, and 
intolerance, we conducted a third study that included the Dual-Dimension 





We had 100 participants take the survey through Amazon Mechanical Turk. No 
participants failed over 10% of the attention checks, leaving all 100 participants, 
52% male, 48% female; 74% Caucasian, 13% African-American, 6% Asian- 
American, 5% Hispanic, 2% other. The average age was 35.4 years 
(SD = 10.6). Once again, we felt that a sample at or above 100 participants 
provided sufficient power for our analyses. The methods and results of Study 3 
below report all measures and conditions used, as well as all data exclusions.
Design
The survey was identical to the one used in Study 1,8 with the inclusion of 
the DDHS scale (Wright et al., 2018).
Results
First, we repeated all the analyses run in Studies 1 and 2 to confirm that the same 
effects of, and relationships between, realism and conviction were present. These 
analyses confirmed the same pattern of results: i.e., increased intolerance for 
issues classified as moral, which was driven by the moral issues given realist 
groundings. And once again, people’s conviction was related to both their 
realism and intolerance for moral divergence.
We then turned our attention to the relationships between humility and 
realism, conviction, and intolerance.
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Humility as tolerance-increasing
The reliability of our humility scale was high (α = .91). As hypothesized, it 
was related to decreased intolerance, r(100) = −.32, p= .001. We ran a 
repeated measures ANOVA with domain and tolerance type as within- 
participant variables and humility (low vs. high, based on a mean-split, 
M= 3.02) as a between-participants variable. This revealed a main effect 
for domain, F(3,270) = 20.3, p< .001, η2 = .18 and tolerance type, F 
(3,270) = 9.6, p< .001, η2 = .10, and a significant 2-way interaction between 
domain and tolerance, F(9,810) = 56.8, p< .001, η2 = .56. There was also a 
significant 2-way interaction between tolerance and humility level, F 
(9,810) = 1.9, p= .044, η2 = .02. Specifically, participants high in humility 
reported less intolerance than those low in humility, across all domains, ts 
(98) = 1.8–2.2, ps = .029-.041 (Figure 9).
Moral realism vs. Anti-realism
Humility was also related to decreased intolerance for both anti-realist and 
realist moral divergence, rs(100) = .27 and .26, ps = .011 and .032. We ran a 
repeated measures ANOVA with moral grounding (realism/anti-realism) 
and tolerance type as within-participant variables and humility (low/high) as 
a between-participants variable. This revealed no main effect for grounding, 
F(1,54) = .27, ns. But there was a main effect for tolerance type, F 
(4,216) = 45.4, p< .001, η2 = .46, and a significant 2-way interaction between 
tolerance and grounding, F(4,216) = 58.2, p< .001, η2 = .52.
There was also a significant 2-way interaction between tolerance and 
humility level, F(4,216) = 2.9, p= .024, η2 = .05. Specifically, participants 
high in humility reported that the prohibition of moral divergence was more 
unacceptable, whether objectively or non-objectively grounded, ts(68– 
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Figure 9. Study 3: Tolerance by domain and level of humility.
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tolerance for objectively grounded moral divergence, ts(68–84) = 2.2–2.5, ps 
= .014-.022 (Figure 10). In other words, people high in humility were less 
likely to want to prevent people from expressing and practicing their 
divergent moral views, and also less willing to shun, shame, or punish 
those who held them (even when they regarded these views as being 
objectively grounded).
Moral conviction
Thus far, we have established that humility is related to reduced intolerance, 
especially for those moral issues given objective groundings. But is this a 
direct effect? Or is this because humility is related to the reduction of either 
conviction or realism – or both?
To answer this, we used AMOS 26.0 to analyze a model in which we 
assumed that, once again, realism predicted conviction, which predicted 
intolerance. Then we regressed humility onto all three: realism, conviction, 
and intolerance. The best fitting model showed indeed that realism pre-
dicted conviction (standardized β = .49, p< .001), which predicted intoler-
ance (standardized β = .57, p< .001). Interestingly, humility independently 
predicted reductions in all three (conviction: standardized β = .32, p< .001; 
realism: standardized β = .24, p= .012; intolerance: standardized β = .21, 
p= .009). Goodness of fit indices indicated a good fit for the model: 
Χ2,1 = 2.085, p= .149, NFI = .983, TFI = .945, and CFI = .981. In addition, 
the RMSEA score was .10 (lower = .00, upper = .310), with the correspond-
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Figure 10. Study 3: Tolerance by grounding and level of humility.
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was a suitably “close” fit (Browne & Cudeck, 1993; MacCallum et al., 1996). 
In short, the answer to the question of whether the relationship between 
humility and intolerance is direct or indirect is that it is both (Figure 11).
Though humility was not significantly correlated with perceived consen-
sus, r(100) = .173, p = .09, we nonetheless ran one additional model that 
included consensus, assuming the same relationships with realism and 
intolerance found in Studies 1 and 2, in order to see if this further improved 
model fit. This model showed that consensus was indeed still predictive of 
realism (standardized β = .19, p= .046) and intolerance (standardized β = .20, 
p= .004). Overall, this improved the model fit: Χ2,1 = 4.972, p= .174, 
NFI = .964, TFI = .949, and CFI = .985. In addition, the RMSEA score 
was .08 (lower = .00, upper = .204), with the corresponding PCLOSE 
analysis being non-significant (.264), indicating that the model was a sui-
tably “close” fit (Figure 12).
Figure 11. Study 3: Model of realism, conviction, and humility.
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Discussion
The main take-away from Study 3 is that humility does indeed have a 
palliative effect on intolerance, both directly and indirectly. First, it was 
directly related to reduced intolerance – an effect that did not go away 
when other variables were added to the equation. Second, humility was 
indirectly related to intolerance through conviction (which was directly 
related to intolerance), and through realism (which was in turn related to 
intolerance through conviction). It hence turned out that humility is 
indeed related to reduced intolerance, both directly and indirectly, by 
predicting weaker conviction and less realism, which in turn, predicted 
reduced intolerance.
Figure 12. Study 3: Model of consensus, realism, conviction, and humility.
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General discussion
Moral abolitionists claim that we ought to stop judging things as being 
morally right/wrong, good/bad, etc. One of their most influential arguments 
for this recommendation – the one we focused on in our studies – is the 
argument from intolerance. Proponents of this argument hold that morality 
must be abolished because it makes us less tolerant; it “inflames disputes” by 
tending to “excite and confuse the parties involved”, as Garner (2007, p. 
502) put it; inducing an unreasonable and worrisome smugness toward 
those who disagree.
But is this argument empirically supported? Does morality really decrease 
tolerance? While the studies we reported here do suggest that moral classifi-
cation and intolerance for divergence are related, they also support the 
hypothesis (endorsed by Goodwin & Darley, 2012; Wright, 2018; Wright et 
al., 2013, 2014) that this effect is not so much due to the classification of an 
issue as moral, but rather to the associated metaethical grounding. Even using 
our improved measures of moral realism, participants who regarded moral 
issues as being objectively grounded showed higher attitudinal and behavioral 
intolerance than participants who were anti-realists in their moral grounding.
Importantly, though, we also showed that the intolerance associated with 
realism is at least partially mediated by conviction – people tend to feel more 
strongly about those moral issues they ground objectively and thus, are more 
prone to feel morally “smug” toward those who disagree with them. One 
remedy for this that has been recommended is humility, which we found is 
indeed related to a reduction of intolerance, in part indirectly through a 
reduction in realism and moral conviction, and in part through a direct 
reduction in intolerance, perhaps by helping people to keep in mind the bigger 
picture.
In sum, our results provide a substantive empirical challenge to the moral 
abolitionists’ argument from intolerance. They suggest that morality, by 
itself, is not necessarily related to an increased intolerance for divergence. 
Moreover, they suggest that the psychological forces related to intolerance 
(namely, realism and moral conviction) can be counteracted, in particular, 
by cultivating humility.
Perhaps, then, we can both eat our moral pie and have it too. Given the 
right kind of upbringing, education, information, etc., a “tolerant morality” 
can and should be realized, and may further our social interests more 
strongly than completely abolishing the practice of making moral 
judgments.
Of course, challenging an argument against the abolition of morality is 
not the same thing as providing an argument for morality. Is there such an 
argument to be made? While the answer may not be found in the data we 
reported here, we nonetheless think that there is plenty of research 
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suggesting that it can. For example, Wright et al. (2013) found – as we found 
here – that people did not completely agree with each other about which 
issues should be classified as moral, but they nonetheless strongly agreed 
with one another about why they held their classifications. Specifically, these 
studies revealed that whenever people classified something as moral, they 
focused their attention on the potential harm and injustice to innocent 
others associated with the issues under consideration (e.g., rape, discrimi-
nation against minorities, etc.) – outcomes that they wanted to prevent. And 
arguably, these sorts of considerations are not only important to consider, 
there are times when they need to be highlighted and brought to the 
forefront of our social deliberations.
In other words, morality may serve the critical role of bringing into focus 
issues of harm and fairness – and the potential for people to be harmed and 
treated unfairly – so that we can make course corrections (where warranted) 
to protect and promote our individual and collective wellbeing. While 
“moralizing” an issue comes with the potential risk of inflaming people’s 
righteous indignation (their refusal to tolerate divergence), there have been 
times in our history when this was a risk worth taking, especially since we 
appear to have ways of managing and mitigating it.
There is one additional cautionary note worth mentioning, though, and 
that is the fact that perceived consensus predicted intolerance, both indir-
ectly, by increasing realism (which in turn, increases conviction, and, there-
fore, intolerance), and directly. One thing this suggests is that intolerance 
for divergent beliefs, values, and practices can easily breed in small, homo-
genous groups; groups whose members all share the same views. This 
suggests that one additional step we must be careful to take is to widen 
our group identities to include a wide swath of beliefs, values, and practices. 
The more diversity in views we are exposed to, the more tolerant of those 
differences we will become.
Notes
1. Proponents of abolitionism are not only critical of morality’s effects on our well- 
being, but also of its philosophical soundness. Most often they have argued that it 
rests on a flawed presupposition – namely, that while moral judgments purport to 
represent moral facts (or more specifically, facts of a certain kind, e.g., objective and 
categorically prescriptive facts), the world is devoid of such facts, making our moral 
judgments necessarily false. Like astrology or discourse about witches or phlogiston, 
morality rests on a fundamental error – it presupposes things that do not exist (see 
Mackie, 2011 for the classic formulation of this error theoretic or nihilist stance). Yet, 
even if one accepts that there are moral truths one may still harbor doubts about the 
value of moral judgments. And it is coherent to hold that we would be better off if we 
ignored them (for a discussion of the possibility of “realist” abolitionism see Ingram, 
2015).
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2. The tasks given for the three factual statements were altered to reflect disagreements 
not about the acceptability of actions, but about the truth of the statements themselves 
(e.g., whether the earth is flat, with one person believing it is and the other person not 
believing that it is).
3. Once again, the tolerance questions for the three factual statements were altered to 
reflect not the acceptability of action, but the acceptability of belief (e.g., whether you 
agree that the earth is flat, how willing you would be to condone/prohibit the belief, 
support or shun others who believe it, etc.).
4. While it might be surprising that only 55–64% classified the factual statements as 
“realist”, some people are anti-realists (or believe they are anti-realists) with regard to 
all matters, including factual ones. Moreover, other studies (e.g., Goodwin & Darley, 
2008; Nichols, 2004; Pölzler et al., 31) show similar results for these kinds of 
statements.
5. This might be one explanation for why the factual issues received lower realist 
classifications that one might expect (see also footnote 4).
6. Even so, our measure only captured a few of the subjectivist metaethical views, 
namely cultural relativism, individual subjectivism, and divine command theory. 
But there are other more sophisticated views of this kind that we did not test for 
(e.g., ideal observer theory and constructivism). In Study 2 we did not account for this 
particular objection – both because there are good theoretical reasons to believe that 
only few people are drawn toward more sophisticated subjectivist views, and because 
testing these views via our preferred measures is pragmatically infeasible. We did 
make a small amendment with regard to cultural relativism, though. While previously 
we had tested whether participants regard moral truth as being dependent on the 
dominant moral beliefs of their culture, Study 2 tests a relativization to “cultural 
communities”, i.e., potentially smaller social units than cultures as a whole.
7. In a different way we might also have biased people in favor of realism. Our original 
measure involved the term “disagreement”. At the end of each task, for example, we 
asked participants “Which interpretation of this disagreement seems most appro-
priate to you?” On a common interpretation, persons morally disagree with each 
other if and only if they believe logically incompatible moral propositions, i.e., 
moral propositions that cannot both be true, or false (Strandberg, 2004; 
Wedgwood, 2014). Critics may thus argue that we biased people toward realism. 
In response to this worry we substituted the term “disagreement” with the metaethi-
cally neutral term “situation”.
8. The data for Study 3 was collected before we made the revisions to the methodology 
discussed in Study 2. Since we did not find any striking differences in results between 
Studies 1 and 2, we decided not to recollect the data with the revised methodology – 
we felt it would be an unnecessary expense of research funds and time.
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